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Concept in mechanism design
explanation needed] Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is a strengthening of strategyproofness that captures a robustness of strategyproofness to cognitively-limited
Strategyproofness
Group strategyproofness (GSP), also called coalitional strategyproofness, is a property of mechanisms and voting rules in social choice theory and mechanism
Group_strategyproofness
Family of proportional election methods
tie-breaking rule, it might become non-strategyproof. Cardinality-strategyproofness and inclusion-strategyproofness are satisfied by utilitarian approval
Multiwinner_approval_voting
Fair division protocol in computing
condition "sharing incentive"). Strategyproofness: a user cannot get a larger allocation by lying about his needs. Strategyproofness is important, as evidence
Dominant_resource_fairness
Again, one can define DD-strategyproofness, BD-strategyproofness, SD-strategyproofness and PC-strategyproofness. Participation - abstaining from participation
Fractional_social_choice
Method for group decision-making
anonymous and strategyproof for all single-peaked preferences if it is equivalent to a median rule with at most n+1 phantoms. A rule is strategyproof for all
Median_voting_rule
Impossibility result for ranked-choice voting systems
outcomes to two alternatives only; or The rule is manipulable, i.e. not strategyproof, i.e., there is no single always-best strategy (one that does not depend
Gibbard–Satterthwaite_theorem
Category of mathematical proof
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes
Proof_of_impossibility
Probabilistic Condorcet method
the standard notion of strategyproofness, as Allan Gibbard has shown that only random dictatorships can satisfy strategyproofness and ex post efficiency
Maximal_lotteries
Logical paradox in decision-making theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Paradox_of_tolerance
Concept in game theory
Lindahl tax Monotonicity (mechanism design) Preference revelation Strategyproofness Vazirani, Vijay V.; Nisan, Noam; Roughgarden, Tim; Tardos, Éva (2007)
Incentive_compatibility
Decision rules for participatory budgeting
anonymity, strategyproofness and proportionality among all symmetric single-peaked preferences. UPM is the only rule satisfying strategyproofness and proportionality
Budget-proposal_aggregation
{\displaystyle i} and some valuation vector v − i {\displaystyle v_{-i}} . Strategyproofness means that an agent with real valuation v i {\displaystyle v_{i}}
Monotonicity (mechanism design)
Monotonicity_(mechanism_design)
Electoral system with lottery among ballots
lottery does not discriminate in advance between different voters. Strategyproofness: any false report by an agent results in an outcome that is weakly
Random_ballot
Study of rational collective decision-making
rule satisfying non-imposition (every alternative can be chosen) and strategyproofness when there are more than two candidates is the dictatorship mechanism
Social_choice_theory
Decision rule that selects alternatives that have a majority
two outcomes a voter prefers, not how much. This can be replaced by strategyproofness, i.e. every person's dominant strategy is to honestly disclose their
Majority_rule
Hand game for two players or more
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Rock_paper_scissors
Paper-and-pencil game for two players
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Tic-tac-toe
Proof all ranked voting rules have spoilers
characterization of domain restrictions admitting a nondictatorial and strategyproof social welfare function. These correspond to preferences for which there
Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
Concept in conflict studies
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Conflict_escalation
Game whose outcome can be correctly predicted
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Solved_game
Overuse of a shared resource
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Tragedy_of_the_commons
Search algorithm
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Alpha–beta_pruning
Israeli-American psychologist and economist (1934–2024)
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Daniel_Kahneman
Model of conflict for two players in game theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Chicken_(game)
Problem in process of sharing surplus
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Cooperative_bargaining
Social choice theorem on superiority of majority voting
two outcomes a voter prefers, not how much. This can be replaced by strategyproofness, i.e. every person's dominant strategy is to honestly disclose their
May's_theorem
Hungarian and American mathematician and physicist (1903–1957)
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
John_von_Neumann
Theoretical rule in social choice theory
tied vote, assuming some selected voter has expressed a preference. Strategyproofness: there is never any advantage to tactical voting. Failed criteria
Dictatorship_mechanism
English saying meaning "equivalent retaliation"
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Tit_for_tat
Principle that voting for a candidate should help them
participation criterion can also be justified as a weaker form of strategyproofness: while it is impossible for honesty to always be the best strategy
Participation_criterion
Decrease in severity of conflicts
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
De-escalation
Standard example in game theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Prisoner's_dilemma
Mathematical models of strategic interactions
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Game_theory
Concept in game theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Focal_point_(game_theory)
Branch of game theory about two-player sequential games with perfect information
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Combinatorial_game_theory
Preference of known risks to unknown risks
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Ambiguity_aversion
Complete plan on how a game player will behave in every possible game situation
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Strategy_(game_theory)
Choosing a candidate other than preferred to undercut a less desired one
of two evils Primary election Ranked voting Strategic nomination Strategyproofness Vote allocation Vote swapping Farquharson, Robin (1969). Theory of
Strategic_voting
Academic discipline
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Quantum_game_theory
Game theory case weighing own/others' sacrifice
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Volunteer's_dilemma
Computer program for the Boolean satisfiability problem
019. ISSN 0377-2217. Peters, Dominik (2021). "Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections". arXiv:2104.08594 [cs.GT]. Brandl, Florian;
SAT_solver
Auction priced by second-highest sealed bid
routing problems, this mechanism is not only strategyproof, but also the minimum among all strategyproof mechanisms. In the case of network flows, unicast
Vickrey_auction
Game where groups of players may enforce cooperative behaviour
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Cooperative_game_theory
Diplomatic policy of concessions
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Appeasement
Finding an optimal algorithm for playing chess
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Solving_chess
Israeli psychologist (1937–1996)
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Amos_Tversky
Modelling evolution using differential equations
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Evolutionary_dynamics
Mathematical game
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Guess_2/3_of_the_average
Game illustrating paradox in rational choice theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Dollar_auction
Military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Deterrence_theory
Impossibility of straightforward game forms
best defends her opinions. We then say that approval voting is not strategyproof: once the voter has identified her own preferences, she does not have
Gibbard's_theorem
Situation where total gains match total losses
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Zero-sum_game
Iterated game for peace and conflict studies
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Peace_war_game
Indian researcher and teacher
222–256. Breton, M.L. and Sen, A., 1999. Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability. Econometrica, 67(3), pp. 605–628. Sen, A., 2001
Arunava_Sen
Economic Model
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Bertrand–Edgeworth_model
Decision rule used for minimizing the possible loss for a worst-case scenario
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Minimax
Problem of fair division
true valuations. They are not strategyproof - a partner can gain by reporting false valuations. Indeed, strategyproofness is incompatible with envy-freeness:
Rental_harmony
Solution concept in cooperative game theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Myerson_value
Concept in game theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Shapley_value
Game theory concept
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Bayesian_game
Making of satisfactory, not optimal, decisions
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Bounded_rationality
Facilitating a peaceful outcome to a dispute
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Conflict_resolution
Neologism for cooperative competition
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Coopetition
S a higher utility. Core-FS implies Group-FS. Several variants of strategyproofness (SP) have been studied for voting rules: Individual-SP means that
Fractional_approval_voting
Solution concept of a non-cooperative game
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Nash_equilibrium
Weakly optimal allocation of resources
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Pareto_efficiency
Auction in which every bidder pays
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
All-pay_auction
Fair item allocation problem
-maximin-share Partial, but PE w.r.t. allocated items Also approximately strategyproof when there are many agents. Maximum-Nash-Welfare n {\displaystyle n}
Envy-free_item_allocation
Bidding less than an item is worth in an auction
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Bid_shading
Hand game for two or more players
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Chopsticks_(hand_game)
Variant of Nash equilibrium in game theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Trembling_hand_perfect_equilibrium
Model of humans as rational, self-interested agents
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Homo_economicus
Situation where all parties are worse off
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
No-win_situation
Argument in combinatorial game theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Strategy-stealing_argument
Critiques of democratic political systems
what political action is taken." The median voter preferences show strategyproofness against some abovementioned criticisms of democracy including vulnerability
Criticism_of_democracy
Conflict between safety and cooperation
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Stag_hunt
Political model of international conflict resolution
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Two-level_game_theory
American economist (born 1950)
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
David_M._Kreps
Variation of minimax game tree search
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Negamax
Extension of the prisoner's dilemma
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Optional_prisoner's_dilemma
Subfield of set theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Determinacy
American economist (born 1957)
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Drew_Fudenberg
Solution to the fair division problem
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Moving-knife_procedure
Human behavior pattern in which the participant takes on increasing risk
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Escalation_of_commitment
Hungarian-American economist and philosopher (1920–2000)
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
John_Harsanyi
When a decision-maker's future preferences can contradict earlier preferences
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Dynamic_inconsistency
Application of game theory to evolving populations in biology
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Evolutionary_game_theory
Zero-sum game where competitions between strategies contain a cycle
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Intransitive_game
American economist
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
David_K._Levine
Concept in game theory
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Markov_perfect_equilibrium
Game theory scenario
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Win–win_game
Cooperation between firms to limit competition
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Collusion
system for each issue. The resulting MPM is still strategyproof, as the proof of strategyproofness (below) remains valid as-is. However, it is not neutral
Moving-phantoms_mechanism
Game theory dilemma
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Unscrupulous_diner's_dilemma
alternative of each agent (e.g. plurality voting), RFTT is equivalent to strategyproofness. This means that, for 3 or more outcomes, the only RFTT mechanisms
Regret-free_mechanism
Process of buying and selling goods
such as the trade reduction mechanism are not only strategyproof but also weakly group-strategyproof (meaning that no group of buyers and sellers can benefit
Double_auction
Type of stable matching problem
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Stable_roommates_problem
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Transferable_utility
Paradox of combining strategies
ironing Monotonicity Participation constraint Revelation principle Strategyproofness Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism Virtual valuation Theorems Myerson–Satterthwaite
Parrondo's_paradox
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